Nic Tideman (from his paper):
But there is different use of the scales that is particularly
relevant to questions of social justice, as opposed to personal
disputes. The scales can be used to achieve an equal division.
Justice is done when the contents of one pan of the scales are
exactly balanced by the contents of the other.
Al Date:
I always thought that the scales meant that the punishment should
be "equal" to the crime. But what do I know... :)
Nic Tideman (from his paper):
And then the sword. The sword represents the fact that justice is
prepared to use the threat of force, and force itself, to see that
her decrees are carried out. In a world where men have so often used
weapons to achieve selfish dominance, the feminine gender helps make
credible the claim that the sword is used only to achieve justice,
and not to advance the selfish interests of the person who wields
it.
Al Date:
And I suppose that since women are now in the military and in
politics, that it is time that oppressed men should start lobbying
for a male justice symbol. Batman? :)
Nic Tideman (from his paper):
Even the utilitarian proposal that conflicting claims should be
settled in the way that yields the greatest possible utility must be
rejected as an elitist imposition of a particular goal on people who
may have other plans. If I choose to pursue a life that can be
guaranteed to lead to depression and despair, I have as much claim
to the protection of justice in that pursuit as if I choose the path
that leads to bliss.
Al Date:
I think that this is a very weak example, because the person who
chooses self-misery or even suicide is not necessarily involved in
any "conflicting claims" which affect others and which
therefor may invite a utilitarian calculus.
Nic Tideman, replying to Al Date:
No, a person may want to use a very expensive way of achieving
depression and despair. He may wish to use expensive marble to
impress the world with his talent as a sculptor, when in fact he has
none. He may wish to use a vast array of computers to prove that pi
is a rational number. A utilitarian would put those resources to
work for some purpose that had a chance of achieving happiness for
someone, while a just person would say that if the resources were
bought with his earnings, they are his.
Al Date:
Meanwhile, court decisions regarding rights-of-way and other "stepping
on other's toes" will invariably be decided so as to maximize
utility. That's how the entire bankruptcy system came into effect,
replacing debtor's prisons--much to the chagrin of the
money-lenders.
Nic Tideman responding to Al Date:
I agree that there is a place for contractarian utilitarianism in
decision-making, but I believe it should be confined to instances
where people are making decisions about the use of resources that
are agreed to be theirs, or where people have given their actual
consent to having decisions made by utilitarian criteria.
Al Date:
Maximizing utility may be considered an "elitist imposition"
philosophically, but it usually has the effect of helping the common
people at the expense of the elites--such as allowing common land
uses or flyovers that were not desired by the landlords. It is
impossible for millions of people to get around without
inconveniencing or irritating someone somewhere, and the best that
justice can accomplish is mitigating the irritation.
Nic Tideman responding to Al Date:
Treating land as our common heritage, and requiring anyone who
wants to have exclusive access to part of it to pay the value that
would have to others takes care of this, I believe.
Nic Tideman (from his paper):
If one wishes to make sense of majoritarianism, one must first
specify the perspective from which voters are expected to vote. Are
voters to vote as proponents of their selfish personal interests, or
are they to vote as disinterested judges of what is best? Suppose
first that voters vote on the basis of their selfish personal
interests.
Al Date:
Suppose that a jury must vote unanimously to convict someone of a
crime.
This gives an inherent advantage to the accused. Our system of
justice is based on the idea that it is better that ten guilty men
go free than one innocent man be convicted. But would people stand
for it if 1000 murderers were set free so that one innocent man
would not be convicted? 10,000? 1,000,000? I doubt it.
Justice is a system, a process. It cannot be defined absolutely.
What was "just" 100 years ago, may now be considered
barbaric. So, it can only be "defined" and redefined in
reference to the changing ethics of society.
Our _system_ of justice, unique in the world, is a combination of
common law and the Constitution, most notably, the First Ten
Amendments, formulated from the personal opinions of a small group
of men, led by Thomas Jefferson, who just happened to believe ...
Nic Tideman (from his paper):
We have the right to co-operate with whom we choose for whatever
mutually agreed purposes we choose. Thus we have the right to trade
with others, without any artificial hindrances, and we have the
right to keep any wages or interest that we receive from such
trading.
Al Date:
And in the background of all such classical liberal thought is the
utilitarian justification that this is what works best for the
advancement of the entire society, not just an elite.
Nic Tideman responding to Al Date:
No. Consider blood donations. Our hospitals often run short of
blood. It would be much more efficient to require anyone to donate
blood when his or her name was drawn at random. But we will refrain
from imposing such a system on others, even if we recognize that we
would be better of personally and so would the average person,
because it would be an unjust intrusion on self-determination. It is
not rule utilitarianism, but rather recognition of individual rights
that governs what we think the rules ought to be.
Nic Tideman (from his paper):
These components of the classical liberal conception of justice
are held by two groups that hold conflicting views on a companion
issue of great importance: how are claims of exclusive access to
natural opportunities to be established?
Al Date::
And again, the ultimate solution is found by letting them bid on
it; ie, maximizing production while maximizing the collection of
rent.
Nic Tideman (from his paper):
One tradition in classical liberalism concerning claims to land is
that of > the "homesteading libertarians," as
exemplified by Murray Rothbard, who say that there is really no need
to be concerned with Locke's proviso. Natural opportunities belong
to whoever first appropriates them, regardless of whether
opportunities of equal value are available to others.[13]
Al Date:
I would call that a perversion of classical liberalism, just as
modern economics is a corruption of economics, to coin a phrase. :)
Nic Tideman (from his paper):
The other tradition is that of the "geoists," as
inspired if not ...
Al Date:
Not the other tradition, but the actual tradition...:)
Nic Tideman (from his paper):
... exemplified by Henry George, who say that, whenever natural
opportunities are scarce, each person has an obligation to ensure
that the per capita value of the natural opportunities that he
leaves for others is as great as the value of the natural
opportunities that he claims for himself.[14] Any excess in one's
claim generates an obligation to compensate those who thereby have
less. George actually proposed the nearly equivalent idea, that all
or nearly all of the rental value of land should be collected in
taxes, and all other taxes should be abolished. The geoist position
as I have expressed it emphasizes the idea that, at least when value
generated by public services is not an issue, rights to land are
fundamentally rights of individuals, not rights of governments.
Al Date:
And I believe that all these rules are all aimed at maximizing
utility.
Nic Tideman responding to Al Date:
When maximizing utility conflicts with the principle of equal
liberty, which do you choose?
Al Date responding to Nic Tideman:
Historically, we conflate them.
What is done (whether intentionally or by feeling our way) is to
figure out the best way to maximize utility--and then boldly
proclaim it is a matter of "right." As a recent example, I
offer Roe v Wade. Further back, I would offer alcohol prohibition;
and then its repeal! Further back, I would offer the abolition of
slavery; and the Declaration of Independence.
And, of course, I have already offered as a pertinent example your
own "Georgist economic reform equalling justice."
When we proclaim something as right and just it is our way of
saying that this is the best thing for our society, but with a
righteous and moral intonation.
The test of this is to ask yourself if you would continue to argue
that Georgist economic reform was required for justice if you were
convinced that it was not utility maximizing.
Mase Gaffney responding to Al Date:
Al, you would probably enjoy an old book by James Harvey Robinson
on "Rationalization." It seemed daring in its day; old
stuff now, I suppose.
Fred Foldvary responding to Al Date:
I would.
Just as I would argue against slavery even if it were utility
maximizing, e.g. when a large majority gains more than a small
minority loses.
I have been amused with Austrian-school types advocating utility
maximization when they know utility is subjective, non-measurable,
applicable at marginal rather than total levels, and used in an
ordinal rather than cardinal way in economics.
Mike O’Mara responding to Fred Foldvary:
Yes, that's the distinction needed: the utility of the individual,
versus the utility of "society". Whether a particular
individual advocates freedom or slavery depends on his personal
utility function, and his information about which policies best
increase his utility.
Most people today find their utility decreased by the existence of
slavery, even though a few may find it increased. If most
individuals in the U.S. found that their personal utility is
increased by slavery, forced blood donations, etc., then we would
have those in this country. A free society is only possible if the
majority of people each have personal utility functions in which
their utility is increased by freedom and decreased by slavery, and
if they have the information needed to recognize the effects of
different policies on their personal utility.
Through the process of evolutionary psychology, it is probably the
case that most people have personal utility functions compatible
with a desire for freedom and geonomic justice. The main barrier is
probably the cost of information, so that people could become more
aware of which policies best increase their personal utility.
Nic Tideman (from his paper):
Justice -- the balancing of the scales--is the geoist position, "I
get exclusive access to this natural opportunity because I have left
natural opportunities of equal value for you." (How one
compares, in practice, the value of different natural opportunities
is a bit complex. If you really want to know, you can invite me back
for another lecture.)
Al Date:
I can't wait!
Nic Tideman (from his paper):
Justice is thus a regime in which persons have the greatest
possible individual liberty, and all acknowledge an obligation to
share equally the value of natural opportunities. Justice is
economic reform--the abolition of all taxes on labor and capital,
the acceptance of individual responsibility, the creation of
institutions that will provide equal sharing the value of natural
opportunities.
Al Date:
I could not agree more!! But economic reform is ALWAYS done for
utilitarian reasons, or, alternatively, its outcome is judged by
utilitarian measures. So, it seems that you have admitted that
justice is ultimately a rule-utilitarian device.
And I believe that all these rules are all aimed at maximizing
utility.
When maximizing utility conflicts with the principle of equal
liberty, which do you choose?
