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| Five
Lessons for Land Reformers: The Case of Taiwan |
| [Reprinted from Land
& Liberty, May-June, 1980] |
The gap between the rich and the poor has been narrowing
for the past quarter century on Taiwan, and the country has prospered
greatly under the influence of a land reform which reflected concepts
very similar to the thoughts of Henry George. Elsewhere in the world,
especially in "third world" countries, the rich-poor gap has
been widening. Two such countries were Iran and Nicaragua where bloody
revolutions occurred during 1979. Several times in Progress and Poverty,
Henry George commented on the likelihood of such uprisings under
conditions of increasing income disparity.
The revolutions in Iran and Nicaragua surprised and shocked many, but
hardly surprised the people who were aware of the widening income
disparity. Considerable force was used to collect taxes from the poor
and this added to the rate of ferment. Furthermore, outside forces were
at work. The U.S.S.R. was busy stirring the revolutionary pot, and the
U.S.A. was supporting the Shah of Iran and the President (dictator) of
Nicaragua because they opposed communism. While history seldom smiles on
such revolutions, conditions sufficiently oppressive continue to provoke
them. Writing on land reform in 1960, Chen Cheng, then governor of
Taiwan, said:
"Hunger and starvation
have always bean with us. Desperate people facing starvation are
likely to take advantage of all opportunities to make trouble and
raise the standard of revolt. Students of Chinese history find that
years of civil commotion arising out of a poor harvest far outnumber
the years of peace. Eight or nine Out of ten such disturbances have
been caused by our failure to find a thorough-going and permanent
solution of the land problem."
Henry George had watched what happened in California in the land boom
days as land barons preempted huge tracts of land; and land was then
virtually the sole means of production. His argument was based on the
need to halt monopolization of economic opportunity, and he proposed a
way to do it.[1] He also studied the Irish land
question and said in no uncertain terms that Irish misery resulted from
grossly unequal access to the means of production, and not from
overpopulation. He began to express his ideas about 1860 in news stories
and editorials, and in 1871 published Our Land and Land Policy. In 1879,
one hundred years ago, he finished refining his ideas and published
Progress and Poverty, which had an international impact and influenced
history as far away as Taiwan.
Few reforms are ever realized exactly as first proposed, and this was
true of the Taiwan land reform. It does not strictly follow Henry George
in form, but it does so in spirit, and few reforms in all history have
worked as dramatically. Land was redistributed within a free enterprise
economy; incomes were brought closer to equality, not by exterminating
the rich but by building up the poor. Very few people were hurt in the
process. What happened in Taiwan resulted ftom the fusion of Henry
George's ideas with the ancient Confucian philosophy of equality of
opportunity, and with the thinking of certain German land reformers who
had also been influenced by Henry George.
Chiang Kai-shek, through the land reform, vigorously carried forward
the ideas of equalization of opportunity common to Henry George and Dr.
Sun Yat-Sun.[2] Farmland reform came first,
designed to vest title in the tillers, as was befitting in a nation then
almost solidly agricultural. Urban land reform came later. Increment
taxes were for some years applied only to urban land but were extended
to all land in 1973. They diverted to social projects considerable sums
which would otherwise have become the private harvest of land
speculators.
Land reform began with rural rent control and moved fast to
distribution of the public domain which the Japanese had unwillingly
bequeathed to the Chinese on retrocession. It included the best rice
land on the west coast. In accordance with Dr. Sun's principle of Ming
Shen, this was sold in five-hectare parcels to the peasant families who
had been tilling it. At the same time, rent control reduced to 37+ per
cent of the rice crop the landlords' share on rented farms from 66 per
cent or more. The law was enforceable because of the reservoir of land
in the Japanese domain which was offered for sale on long terms. Terms
of repayment were such that the farmer did not have to pay more than 37+
per cent of his rice crop income. As soon as these laws were partly
digested, the government began to buy land from the landlords and resell
it to the tenants on similar terms so that no farmer had to pay out more
than 37+ per cent.
This affected the local economy more markedly and more rapidly than
even the most optimistic advocates had dared to predict. Dr. Sun had
long since pointed out in the Son Mm Chu-I (the Three Principles of the
People) that industrialization should follow, not precede, the building
up of the internal capacity to consume. The land reform did just that.
Farmers doubled their income when rents came down to 37-1/2 per cent;
and, thus encouraged, proved again the truth of Henry George's
statement:
Give a man security that he may
reap and he will sow.
Assure a man of the possession of a house
he wants to build and he will build it. These are the natural rewards
of labor. It is for the sake of reaping that men sow; it is for the
sake of possessing houses that men build.
With the landlords brought to bay and with assured possession, the
farmers began to plant second crops of rice and intervening crops of
vegetables, thus doubling their income a second time. The four-to-one
increase had a multiplier effect throughout the Chinese economy. The
detailed sequence of the economic development is less important than its
impressive totality. Within a decade much of the island was rehoused.
Former adobe structures with thatched roofs and dirt floors gave way to
brick houses with tile roofs and cement floors. Electricity was extended
throughout the countryside: electric fans spell the difference between
comfort and discomfort in such a climate, and they were an early
addition to most country houses. Transportation went through stages from
rusty bicycles to brand-new shiny bicycles to small motorcycles to
automobiles. With each economic change came a new industry, selling to
an indigenous local market bicycles, electric appliances, and later
motorbikes.
Income equalization. For some time the World Bank has been computing an
index of income equality. The process is notoriously imprecise because
of the spongy nature of the input data, but in crude terms it is
revealing. As land reform took a firm hold in Taiwan, the income per
capita of the least affluent fifth of the population increased relative
to the income per capita of the most affluent fifth. The land reform
built the prosperity of the country from the bottom up. This did not
mean that the top was cut down. The top continued to rise, but the
bottom fifth rose so much faster that the gap between them narrowed.
This is the first great lesson from Taiwan: proper allocation of
resources combined with the diligence of a naturally hard- working
population greatly improves the economic circumstances of the bottom
quintile. It does not totally eliminate poverty, but the general benefit
to the lowest quintile is spectacular. Taiwan is not a unique example;
the same principle was applied, with equally effective results, in
post-war Japan through the land reform of 1946, and very similar results
were achieved in South Korea.
Keeping people busy. The second lesson from Taiwan is related to the
first. At the start the country banned the importation of large
tractors. It recognized that it had surplus human power, limited land,
and a dearth of foreign exchange. The Chinese agricultural experts
reached the correct conclusion that more food could be grown by hand and
water buffalo from a hectare of land than could be produced by
large-scale mechanized farming. This fact has been demonstrated the
world over. Tractors and other farm machinery save man-hours of labour,
but do little else, and a country with a manpower surplus does not need
that.
Countries which imported large machinery accomplished minimal increases
in production, but faced the displacement of tenant farmers. The
availability of farm machinery holds back land tenure reform. Large
landowners can make more money by displacing tenants and mechanizing, so
they like the new arrangement. But displaced farm tenants have no place
to go but to the edges of cities where they cluster in urban slums and
where they have to be fed on the bounty of those working.
When industrialization was far enough advanced, and a manpower balance
attained, Taiwan began to mechanize farms to release manpower to
industry. The second lesson is not to displace agricultural labour,
until the industrial sector has developed enough to begin to demand it.
Political gains. The third lesson is political. Asian government is
sufficiently different from American that confusion results when Chinese
try to find adequate words to describe what goes on in America and
Americans find equal or greater trouble in trying to describe the
government of Taiwan. Americans are fond of political cliches and like
to sort systems into tidy categories, appropriately labelled, each to
its own bin. America has been prone to classify the government of Taiwan
as a dictatorship and to criticize the government and also General
Chiang Kai-shek accordingly. The Taiwanese central government exercises
more power over more things than the White House does in America,
although recent American administrations seem to have been trying hard
to catch up. Below the level of central government, Taiwan is quite
democratic.
Taiwan is more democratic than any Chinese government of the mainland
has been within recorded history, and far more democratic than about 100
of the 144 members of the UN. Dictatorships, incidentally, can have
broad popular support, as various powerful monarchs have proved over the
span of history; they can also be feared and tolerated only because of
the force at their command.
The Chinese government on Taiwan earned very broad-based support by the
land reform. The majority of the island's population were peasants. Asia
has a long memory, and the one-time tenant farmers remember what life
was like before land reform. The older generation has told the younger.
This has not altogether erased a lingering uncertainty on the part of
the "old islanders" towards the newcomers who arrived in a
rush around 1950; it has nevertheless left a very comfortable power base
for the island government. The Japanese and Chinese mentality differ
enough to suggest restraint in generalization, but the same general
result followed the land reform in Japan. The third lesson is: A land
reform which upgrades the economic condition of the peasantry provides
an important political power base for the government that engineers the
reform.
The raunchy reality. The fourth lesson is different, and has sometimes
been called the raunchy reality of land reform. The landlords of Taiwan
included the Japanese Land Company and a number of ethnic Chinese, "old
islanders," who had been active Japanese collaborators, The
Japanese deserved the unpopularity they earned in Taiwan during their
50-year occupation and few Chinese tears were shed over the acquisition
of the Japanese public domain, The collaborators had acted like
traditional Asian landlords, They gave only verbal leases, terminable at
their pleasure. The rent was nominally about two thirds of the crop, but
the landlords, at least the larger ones, employed estate agents who
extracted from the local farmers whatever they could, paid enough to the
landlord to keep him reasonably happy and pocketed the balance until the
shifting of the economic sand forced a landlord to sell, and the agent
could buy his way into the land-owning class, The small "village"
landlord, usually an ex-farmer or a farmer's widow, generally did not
use an estate agent but dealt with the tenants in an atmosphere of
mutual respect. The "big" landlord was an object of village
obloquy; the "village" landlord was an object of village
sympathy.
Most of the land was owned by "big" landlords and the reform
process involved their removal. In Japan they were bought out in yen
which promptly declined in value through inflation leaving many of them
stranded, too old to go back to work and unable to live on the pittance
inflation left them. In Taiwan, the landlords were compensated in New
Taiwan (NT) dollars, but the compensation contracts were tied to a
commodity base. The annual payment was computed in terms of the number
of NT dollars required to buy a certain quantity of rice or sweet
potatoes. This made the payment reasonably inflation proof.
Collectively landlords invariably oppose land reforms. At the very
least it involves change, and change is always traumatic. To many the
prospect suggests the loss of financial position and social prestige;
they just cannot see beyond the first step. Landlords in Taiwan and
Japan were no exception to this rule. Some ex4andiords from Taiwan still
rail against the indignities heaped upon them by the government and find
some sympathetic ears in the US.
In the Philippines, the Senate, also landlord-dominated, blocked reform
which the House had approved, until about the time Marcos declared
martial law, disbanded Parliament, and pushed land reform dictatorially.
In Thailand the entrenched nobility and other landowners have blocked a
really effective land reform, although lower echelons of government keep
talking about it. In Nicaragua and San Salvador, the land was owned by a
handful of friends and relations of the dictators, and the peasants were
left to fester at the bottom of the pile. The fourth lesson from Taiwan
is: Land reform must be imposed on the landowners by a central
government strong enough to do it.
The follow-through. In a country that needs a land reform the peasantry
usually depend on their landlords for credit to buy seed and fertilizer,
do other banking transactions and handle much of the marketing. The
landlords function in all these capacities. They are often the rice
millers, the bankers, and the local suppliers of whatever is needed to
make a crop. They also often are the sole marketing vehicle. If this
situation is not changed, the tenants quickly come back under their
influence and the landlords wind up owning the land again in a short
time.
In Taiwan, a system of cooperatives had developed in Japanese times as
a semi-underground movement. The cooperatives were bankers of a sort,
hiding wealth from the Japanese and providing other clandestine
services, and they developed strength and peasant confidence. When the
land reform took place, the cooperatives emerged and became the dominant
factor in supply, marketing, and local banking. They have never enjoyed
an exclusive monopoly; farmers can buy and sell from and to whomsoever
they wish, but the cooperatives generally offer the "best deal."
This has been a significant factor in making the land reform "stick."
The tax system must also be designed so that the farmers are not taxed
out of their holdings. Rural taxes in Taiwan are almost entirely on land
and are kept at a level which encourages the farmers, and does not in
any way discourage them.
The fifth lesson is: To make a land reform "stick,"
marketing, supply, and credit facilities must be supplied so that the
farmers are not driven back into the clutches of the former landlords.
REFERENCES
1.Our Land and land Policy advocated
that Federal Land grants should be restricted to bona fide farmer
settlers. Railroad land not yet distributed should he recaptured for the
benefit of the public. California's possessory laws should not protect
large holdings of dubious title, several of which were based on rather
shadowy Mexican land grants. Great aggregations of land should be taxed
at full value, like small holdings. There should be a heavy inheritance
tax. Financially weak persons should have some exemption from the land
tax.
2. See Chen Cheng, Land Reform in Taiwan,
China Publishing Co., Taiwan, 1961. Chapter lit an excellent summary of
the Chinese land reform background. The balance of the book is an
equally excellent description of the land reform, 1950 to about 1960.
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