.
Henry George suspected that the emerging neo-classical school
of economics was designed to silence the single tax movement by
crippling the language of the land question. [George, 1898: 200-209]
As Mason Gaffney documents in an earlier chapter, George was at least
partly correct. [Gaffney, 1994] Moreover, the "neoclassical
stratagem" of suppression continued to be pursued many years after
George's death. [Ibid.; see also Feder, forthcoming (FH's title)]
Lest the reader suppose that Gaffney has rewritten history to boost
Henry George -- or, that economists today have finally put aside
politically-motivated resentments, and are prepared to face and defeat
the Georgists with unassailable logic -- consider a recent attack
published by The Free Market Foundation of Johannesburg. [Grant,
1994] Referring to the current dialogue in South Africa regarding
the use of taxation as a tool of land reform, [see Franzsen and
Heyns, 1992; others, FH?] Richard Grant disparages the Georgist
proposal as merely another dangerous scheme to nationalize land. The "single
tax on land rent," [51] he warns, is unjust and
confiscatory; it flagrantly disregards legitimate property rights; it
compels arbitrariness in assessments, inviting collusion and corruption
in government. Worst of all, it is inconsistent with the operation of a
market system, and leads inevitably to socialism.
Grant reinforces his position with frequent appeals to the authority of
Frank Knight, the Chicago School economist who, according to Gaffney, "probably
produced more NCEism and NCEism than anyone in history." [Gaffney,
p90]
As Gaffney observes, Knight's treatment of the land question "reads
like a caricature of Chicago." [Gaffney, this volume, my 91]
Grant's assault, in turn, reads like a caricature of Frank Knigh -- like
a silly spoof of the neo-classical paradigm. Grant has assembled two
dozen of the most transparent single-tax fallacies, throwing in a couple
more of his own devising. What is frightening is that uninformed
readers, concluding that the single tax is a hoax, may give it no
further consideration.
Some, though not all, of the efficiency advantages of taxes on rent or
land value are widely recognized by mainstream economists. According to
Grant, however, the single tax is as inefficient as it is as
inequitable. A tax on rent, he believes, is just like any other tax: All
have unfortunate consequences for economic incentives; they should be
applied at low rates, and only as necessary to raise revenue. There is
nothing "magical" about a special tax collecting all of land
rent. On the contrary, if applied at rates approaching 100%, as
single-tax advocates insist, it would cripple land markets, paralyzing
their inherent tendency to allocate land to its most productive uses.
Grant opens with the assertion that "the distinction between
man-made and natural factors of production-that is, between capital and
land ... is irrelevant when discussing intervention and taxation: the
consequences will be the same for any asset." [51] Nothing
could be further from the truth. Taxes are, or ought to be, predictable
long-term arrangements; so the long-run supply conditions of productive
factors are critical to the effects of taxes upon them. A tax on the
ownership of capital will, in the long run, discourage the production of
new capital. A tax on the ownership of nonproduced land has no such
disincentive effect.
Grant does not consider this, however; he takes a different angle. "Rent,"
he writes, "is a general phenomenon that applies to all assets, not
only land." [52] The implicit suggestion is that one can
refute George by redefining terms -- the standard neo-classical
stratagem.
Henry George followed Ricardo in defining rent as the amount by which
the product of a land parcel exceeds that of the best available no-rent
land. Rent, in other words, is the minimum amount which a prospective
user would have to pay, in a competitive market, to outbid all others
for the use of land. As we now say, rent is the opportunity cost of land
use.
Grant, however, defines "economic rent" as "the
difference between the return to one asset and the return to the poorest
asset being used for the same purpose." Thus, presumably, the rent
of a car used in transportation is equal to the difference between its
return and that of the least efficient bicycle, or pair of feet, used
for the "same purpose" -- however narrowly or broadly that
phrase may be interpreted.
The definition given any term is neither right nor wrong; it is simply
more or less useful in facilitating thought. Now, George's classical
definition of rent is intelligible and eminently useful, particularly
for analysis of the issue at hand. Grant's definition, by contrast, is
plagued by ambiguity, and serves little function in economic inquiry. It
matters not that Grant's definition of "economic rent" differs
subtly from the usual, equally problematic, neo-classical definition,
because he takes it nowhere. It is as though economists have redefined "rent"
in a manner calculated to dispose of the term altogether.
Grant's next argument is, I think, novel. He says that a 100% tax on
rent would, through tax capitalization, "make the price of land the
same everywhere, regardless of location or quality." True enough --
the selling price of all unimproved land will be zero. But Grant draws
the surprising conclusion that "this artificial leveling of
relative prices" would "leave no differential rent for
purposes of economic calculation," "blinding" the land
market "with respect to quality." [52]
Grant seems to mean that, since all land bears the same (zero) price,
users are indifferent among land parcels of different qualities.
Plainly, however, if all items of a kind are priced equally, buyers will
hardly be blinded to quality; quite the contrary, they will choose among
them on the basis of qualitative and locational differences alone. Just
as obviously, a uniform (zero) price for title to land does not mean
that the cost of land to buyers is the same for all land. The high or
low purchase prices paid for good or poor land are simply commuted into
high or low annual rent payments. Rents continue to perform their
function of allocating scarce land to its highest-yielding uses. If
bidders for land have different preferences for land consumption and/or
different comparative advantages in production, land subject to rent
taxation will also be allocated efficiently among users.
In fact, as Georgists have shown, a high tax on rent causes land
markets to operate more fluidly, competitively, and efficiently. By
slashing start-up costs, the tax makes easier for productive users to
acquire land. It improves efficiency by bypassing the distortions
introduced by inherently Imperfect capital markets. The annual tax also
functions far better than once-for-all prices to signal landowners of
the current opportunity cost of holding possession. [Gaffney, 1992]
The source of Grant's confusion emerges in his next two paragraphs. He
interprets the Georgist position to mean that "any benefit that a
landowner derives from land that is better than the worst land in use is
to be taxed away." [52] He asks, "What good are title
deeds if the government takes all the net income [i.e., if income is
expropriated]?" [53] Grant evidently supposes that the tax
assessment on a particular parcel of land would depend upon how
productively the current owner is putting it to use -- so that the
harder and smarter he works, the higher go his taxes, leaving him no
reward for superior effort.
This does not describe the Georgist tax on land rent, which is a
market-determined measure of the annual opportunity cost of land
possession, i.e., of its potential productivity as estimated by market
participants. The true Georgist tax is a fixed charge from the point of
view of the individual title-holder; it leaves to the owner the full
wages and interest of the labor and capital which he contributes to
production, plus any entrepreneurial profit or loss. Economic incentives
are channeled in the right direction. Ironically, Grant's criticism
correctly applies, not to the Georgist proposal, but instead to
traditional taxes based on income or production.
A second error is operative here. "How long would you want to hold
an asset from which the income is expropriated?" In other words:
How long would you want to hold an asset for which you must pay the
opportunity cost on an annual basis? The answer is: As long as the value
of the asset to you continues to meet or exceed the value of the asset
to others. The point holds no mystery for anyone who has ever leased a
car, rented an apartment, or borrowed money at interest.
Turning next to the issue of land speculation, Grant objects to the
single tax on several ethical and efficiency grounds. He fumes:
By what standard do the Georgists and other
interventionists label someone an "idle hoarder" or "speculator"?
And by what right would they penalise these people? Doing so would
require some standard superior to the market, but they cannot
demonstrate what that is. [53]
Quoting Frank Knight, Grant observes that in competitive markets,
buyers pay, in the purchase price of land, the entire present value of
expected potential future net land income. Land speculation is risky and
expensive; speculators do not, on average earn undue profits. Moreover,
if society proposes to confiscate the gains of the winners, it ought to
compensate the losses of the losers-not only to meet the demands of
Justice, but also to preserve entrepreneurial incentives.
Yes, it ought! And it does, automatically, under the single tax. When
land values rise, so do taxes -- and symmetrically, when land values
fall, taxes fall proportionately. The risk of appreciation or
depreciation caused by events outside the landowners's control are borne
by society as a whole, not by individual landowners. Pooled, the risks
decline. Gains and losses resulting from private entrepreneurial
activity, on the other hand, are untaxed.
On the subject of economic efficiency, Grant works both sides of the
street, arguing inconsistently that it is undesirable to use rent
taxation to discourage speculation since speculators "provide a
valuable service" -- but that, anyway, the tax will not succeed in
forcing marginal land into use. [54-55]
The Georgist position on land speculation may be summarized as follows.
When neighborhood land uses are changing, it is occasionally efficient
to postpone land development or redevelopment until a new use becomes
remunerative. This occurs when no potential interim use can be expected
to yield revenues sufficient to amortize sunk capital before the optimal
time of redevelopment. A tax on land rent or land value does not disturb
such efficient land speculation, since the owner can reduce only his net
income -- not his fixed tax burden -- by developing the land
prematurely. [Feder, 1993] Thus, insofar as speculators do "provide
a valuable service," rent taxation will not disturb their choices.
Marginal land bears no tax, so will not be forced into use, just as
Grant says. With respect to efficient land use, rent taxation is
neutral.
On the other hand, there are a host of reasons why inefficient land
speculation frequently occurs. I noted above that rent taxation corrects
inefficiencies arising from capital market imperfections, and that the
annual charge reminds inattentive owners of the income forgone when land
is underused. Georgists have shown that rent taxation systematically
penalizes at least some forms of inefficient speculation, thus
intensifying market pressures to use land productively. [Brown,
1927; Gaffney, 1992; Feder, "Speculation," FH?] One writer
calls this characteristic of rent taxation "superneutrality."
[Dwyer, 1981: 128ff]
In short, the standard to which Georgists hold the speculator is the
standard of social efficiency. The single tax does not necessitate "some
standard superior to the market": It makes the market operate
better, closer to the competitive ideal. Nor is the single tax motivated
by envy, a scheme to strip successful businessmen of their hard-earned
wealth. The aim of the single tax is to distribute the value of natural
and social resources fairly among all, while leaving producers the full
earnings of their labor and capital, untaxed.
Henry George wrote, "We must make land common property," [George,
1879: 328] and erected a lightning rod which has attracted unending
criticism. Few terms have engendered more confusion in economics than
the phrase, "common property." It is no surprise that Grant
manages to muddle the issues as thoroughly here as elsewhere.
The Georgists have apparently forgotten that we are no
longer a hunter-gatherer society.
Even though all land may once
have been common "property," this does not give to every
newborn today a share in everyone else's property. The whole meaning,
and practical virtue, of private property is that it is privately
owned and controlled. ...The collective farms of the old Soviet Union
prove this. ...A drive through the tribal land of (the now former)
Lebowa is very instructive on the issue of common property. ...The
grass has been overgrazed and the trees are steadily disappearing.
It
is in those regions where property rights are suppressed or
undeveloped that no one laughs at Malthus. [55-56]
Grant nowhere explains what Soviet collectives and Lebowan tribal
commons have to do with the single tax; he trusts the reader to
thoughtlessly accept the implicit analogy. It is false. The subterfuge
relies on the merging of three distinct concepts.
Soviet collectives were state-owned and state-controlled government
property, not common property. With no exclusive rights of tenure,
workers had little incentive to concern themselves with productivity.
Lands (also air, water, or biological species) that are freely
accessible to all comers, with no regulatory mechanism to ration their
use, are not common property (res communis) but "nobody's
property" (res nullius). When human populations are
relatively large, such a resource is characterized by overexploitation
and depletion. Users have no direct stake, individually, in maintaining
the asset value of the resource, since they possess only rights of
extraction and use, not exclusive rights of ownership. Trees left
standing, or fish left swimming, are resources ceded to competitors.
All of this was recognized by Henry George. The function of the single
tax is to strengthen, not weaken, the legitimate property claims of
labor and capital -- while guaranteeing the equal right of every person
to the use of the primary, nonproduced resources necessary for all
production. Without access to natural opportunities, after all, the
celebrated right to enjoy the product of one's own labor, thrift, and
ingenuity becomes a cruel joke.
I have never heard anyone openly reject the ethical proposition that
all human beings ought to be accorded equal opportunity to avail
themselves of what nature provides. Even Grant falls short of this; he
twists away by pretending that the Georgist ethical premise implies a
free-for-all. This, indeed, is the puzzle: How can equal rights to land
be assured in an industrial and service economy, where an equal physical
division of land among individuals would be hopelessly inefficient?
Those unfamiliar with Georgist thought typically accept the existing
system of fee simple land tenure despite its evident inequities,
presuming that land cannot be made common property without creating
economic and political chaos. The core contribution of Henry George lies
here: In a monetary market economy with democratic political
institutions, natural resources can be fairly shared by the device of
collecting rent -- all of it -- by taxation, using the revenue (along
with that from other user charges and taxes) for the support of
government. (Part of the rent could be simply paid out as an equal cash
dividend to each citizen. The dividend would operate like the personal
exemption credited to taxpayers in the U.S. personal income tax system
-- except that it would be enjoyed even by those with little or no
taxable income.)
The tax upon land values falls upon those who receive from
society a peculiar and valuable benefit, and upon them in proportion
to the benefit they receive. It is the taking by the community, for
the use of the community, of the value that is the creation of the
community. It is the application of the common property to common
uses. [Henry George, 1879: 421]
The genius of the single tax is that it allows rents to be shared
without disturbing the system of private, exclusive land use which is
indispensable for harnessing productive incentives and exploiting the
advantages of specialization and scale economies. Society need not
alienate the common property to individual ownership in fee simple to
enjoy the benefits of a market system. Equity need not be compromised in
the name of efficiency, nor efficiency compromised for the sake of
equity. We can have both, [* footnote: Ayn Rand liked to say that
when good compromises with evil, evil wins and good loses.]
Under the Georgist system, everyone willing to pay its opportunity cost
to society can get title to as much land as he likes; and he may, within
reasonable bounds, do with it what he will. If government expenditures
are optimal, then an individual who happens to take title to his equal
value -- share of land will receive, in the cost of public goods and
transfers enjoyed, an amount exactly equal to the rent he pays to the
community for his land title. An individual who takes more than his
equal share of land will, on balance, just compensate the community for
encroaching upon others' shares. An individual who chooses not to own
any land still receives his equal share of rent, in consideration of the
fact that his abstention leaves all the more land for others to use.
Under the single tax, everyone is a rent-taker. Ultimately, of course,
everyone also pays for the productive contribution of natural resources
in proportion to his consumption, since the prices of consumer goods and
services reflect land, as well as labor and capital, costs.
The value of land expresses in exact and tangible form the
right of the community to land held by an individual; and rent
expresses the exact amount which the individual should pay to the
community to satisfy the equal rights of all other members of the
community. [Ibid.: 344]
The value of a plot of land reflects not only the value of the natural
resources it contains, but also its location with respect to markets,
people, jobs, schools, recreational areas, and all manner of public
goods and services, such as police and fire protection, schools, and
infrastructure.
When private activities incidentally enhance or depress neighboring
land values, economists speak of positive or negative spatial
externalities. If I plant a cool orchard where once bare terrain burned
under the sun and eroded in the rains, my neighbor's land rises in
value; if I erect a noisy, smoky factory, my neighbor's land value
falls. Similarly, the benefits of access to local public goods lodge in
land values. For example, many families prefer to live in communities
where the public schools have a good reputation; so the demand for --
and price of -- land in these districts is higher than elsewhere, ceteris
paribus.
Ideally, perhaps, individuals should be compensated for emitting
positive externalities and penalized for emitting negative ones. A set
of so-called Pigouvlan taxes and subsidies could, in principle, "internalize"
externalities to achieve efficiency, essentially by creating
quasi-markets. Economists love these. They are, of course, just Georgist
taxes on rent, applied to fluid (air and water) resources which had been
previously treated more or less as res nullius.
Unfortunately, for most everyday spatial externalities, it is
prohibitively expensive, if not impossible, for a tax assessor to
measure the aggregate net external impact of any one individual's
activities. Without this information, the theoretically optimal tax for
that individual cannot be found, and supply incentives £or
externalities will fall short of ideal.
Fortunately, however, markets can, on the demand side, effectively
ration scarce access to spatial externalities and public goods. The
rationing mechanism is rent, and it works fairly well even when land is
subject to private property in fee simple. It will work magnificently
under the single tax, designed to include effluent fees and related
environmental-use charges where feasible.
Georgists have said the single tax is best conceived a "user
charge." Grant disparages the phrase, but its rationale is easy to
see. Taxes proper are involuntary payments, owed by virtue of residence
in a given geographically-defined political jurisdiction. The taxpayer
enjoys the benefits of public expenditure, of course, but he has no
choice (except as one voter among many) about the level of taxes;
anyway, there is little correlation between the amount of his tax and
the value to him of the benefits he receives. User charges, by contrast,
are prices, paid voluntarily in exchange for benefits received.
There can be little doubt, then, that taxes on the rents arising from
government expenditure are equivalent to user charges. If the Georgist
ethical principle is accepted, and natural resources and
privately-generated (but unattributed) externalities are treated as
common property, then all rent taxes (in a society with just and
democratic political institutions) may be conceived as user charges.
Grant strays from the point with several remarkable complaints. First,
he writes that a tax on land rent "lower[s] returns to all capital
and labour used on that property." Surely it is plain that taxes on
capital and labor, which Georgist yearn to abolish, are considerably
more likely than land taxes to lower the returns to labor and capital!
The fact is, tax capitalization, which Grant elsewhere accepts, implies
that a tax on pure rent does not lower the returns to labor and capital.
Incredibly, he next uses the notion of spatial externality to argue
that a rent tax is really a tax on labor and capital -- since "whenever
they tax one person's property, they are in fact taxing everyone else's
labour and capital that have contributed to its value." [58]
It does not take an economist to see that the persons responsible for
emitting externalities which affect a given property do not pay the land
tax on that property, directly or indirectly. The person who benefits
from their activities, by virtue of his possession of well-situated
land, pays the tax, ensuring that private individuals do not receive
windfall gains or suffer windfall losses merely by virtue of their
location with respect to external influences out of their control.
Quoting a pair of single-taxers who make much of the distinction
between men and Mankind, Grant goes on to accuse Georgists of "methodological
collectivism. ...They fail to see that their 'community' is an
abstraction, not an acting entity that can create value." [57]
I trust I have said enough to show that the community is not a vacant
abstraction but a collection of real individuals, institutions, and
capital.
Though he is shooting blanks, Grant has no shortage of ammunition. His
next angle is to argue that rent takers receive no unearned income
because they pay for the land which yields them rent! Again he quotes
Frank Knight: "[T]he value alleged to be socially created is always
paid for before it is received -- as far as the parties most interested
are able to predict its arising." [57, from Knight, 1953: 809]
There is no denial, only neglect, of the fact that market expectations
of the future are frequently and understandably wrong, so windfall gains
and losses accrue to landowners. The benefits of government projects are
particularly difficult to foresee many years in advance. The question
is: Should the land gains resulting from proximity to government
services and other community activities accrue to private landowners
individually, or should they be pooled, and used for the support of the
government and the citizenry?
Grant's confusion, inherited from Knight, runs deeper than the
convenient fiction of perfect foresight. Because land has an opportunity
cost to the firm or household, they deny that rent constitutes a social
dividend. Their fallacy of composition has been exposed by Mason
Gaffney, in this volume:
In treating rent, Knight totally fuses the individual and
the social viewpoints. ...Competition is the key, it can justify
anything. ...Knight wrote that land yields no unearned surplus so long
as competition keeps the returns to individuals at market levels. A "run
of free income" ... ceases being a surplus to Knight as soon as
someone buys it from someone else. ...The origins of property are of
no concern, only the trade in property. [Gaffney, this volume: my
pp 90-92]
Wages are the earnings of human effort in production. Interest is the
reward for thrift and foresight in accumulating and employing capital.
Rent is the payment for the use of land, with consideration for the
value of natural resources, government services, and net private
externalities (insofar as these cannot be internalized in markets or
quasi-markets). For economic efficiency, rent must be paid by users to
allocate scarce land among competing demands. But there is no efficiency
requirement for rent to be paid to landowners; they do not produce land.
Efficiency is achieved as well - better -- when rent is collected by the
community.
Grant's next argument is that the separate values of land and
improvements cannot be measured, since "economic rent is an
abstract concept that does not appear separately in the market." [58]
It is true enough that rent seldom "appears separately."
Neither do wages: Most products result from the commingled input of
several factors of production. Yet markets do value factors separately,
according to the familiar principle of marginal productivity. Tax
assessments follow the market (assisted by computer-generated cadastral
maps, which plot sales and interpolate surrounding values). Land values
are easier to assess than incomes, which can be concealed, and also
easier to assess than building values, which require on-site inspection.
"Several South African municipalities already practice the art of
valuing land for tax assessment, and enjoy a considerable world
reputation." [Gaffney, 1992: 112]
But Grant has a further, and novel, reason for insisting that land
rents cannot be measured. The very imposition of the single tax itself,
he says, destabilizes the land market: "Any buyer knows that the
more he pays for any property, the more rent he will be forced to pay."
[59] Since the present value of his future taxes rises in
lockstep with the price he pays for the land, a potential land buyer is
indifferent about the price Agreed upon.
However, the Georgist tax on rent is assessed on the basis of current
market valuation, not the historical price of the parcel under
consideration. An individual's bids for land influence future assessed
land values only indirectly and marginally, as one bit of market data
among many. Unless regional land markets are characterized by
significant monopoly power (which Grant would surely deny), an
individual would ignore, as negligible, the influence of his own
revealed demand upon his future land taxes. There is neither evidence
nor theoretical justification for Grant's startling claim that "[t]he
formal land market would largely break down." [59]
Can it be that, of Richard Grant's many objections to the use of rent
as the primary source of public revenue, not one withstands inspection?
After all, plenty of genuinely unsettled questions and difficulties do
remain in the economic theory of land and rent. If he truly wished to
educate himself and others on the issue, Grant could have found them.
One of his comments does carry real weight: The puzzling thing is that
he makes little of it. His readers will have noticed the point, however,
so a few words are due. I refer to the following passage:
At the time of its imposition, there is no escape from the
tax. The owner at that time will suffer a once-off capital loss on the
property value and there is unlikely to be much shifting of ownership.
[53]
I suspect that the reason he has not emphasized the point is that Grant
believes, erroneously, that only part of the burden of the rent tax
falls on current owners, and that future workers, capitalists, and
landowners also bear a large part. In truth, the theory of tax
capitalization suggests that all of a rent tax (or tax increase) on land
rent falls directly on those who own land at the moment the tax
(increase) is announced: Other things equal, the selling price of a plot
land falls by the full present value of all future taxes on that land.
Afterward, a new buyer of the plot gets a reduced stream of after-tax
rent, but pays a proportionately reduced land price, so that the rate of
return is unchanged, and equal to the unchanged rate of return on other
assets. This is the property responsible for the celebrated neutrality
of land taxation. It is precisely because landowners can do nothing to
escape it that the rent tax does not "distort" markets.
Ironically, the very efficiency of the land tax raises the problems of
distributive equity and political acceptability -- though only during
the period of transition to the new tax structure. Inefficient taxes are
popular in part because, through tax shifting, their burden is spread
around in invisible and untraceable ways. Why should current landowners,
whether they inherited their holdings or bought then yesterday at
premium prices, be forced to bear the whole burden of the single tax?
There are good answers, answers which do not depend upon painting
innocent investors as sociopathic criminals.
First, not even the most impatient of Georgists suggests that the
single tax system should be imposed all at once. Tax rates should be
altered gradually, according to an agreed schedule. This allows
individuals time to adjust their land holdings and their investment
plans in order to take best advantage of the reform. In addition, the
more gradually a rent tax increase is introduced once it is announced
(the further in the future is the anticipated tax increase), the lower
is the present value of future land taxes at the date of announcement,
so the smaller is the decline in after-tax rents, and the smaller is the
burden on current landowners. In effect, the burden of tax reform is
shared among all taxpayers, who are compelled to endure the preexisting
system of distortionary taxation so much longer.
Second, the accompanying reduction or elimination of taxes on labor,
capital, and exchange offsets the increase in the rent tax, in the
aggregate -- more than offsets it, in fact, since the excess burden of
taxation is reduced as the overall efficiency of the tax system is
improved. The average household is better off, on balance.
The significance of this is not merely that most landowners are also
capitalists and wage earners too, and thus enjoy direct tax cuts. It is
a fundamental point of tax theory that taxes on production and wealth
are generally shifted forward to consumers insofar as demand is
relatively inelastic, and/or shifted backward to owners of resources
insofar as factor supplies are relatively inelastic. In a small economy
like that of South Africa, where real wages approach subsistence and can
be forced no lower, both labor and capital are highly elastically
supplied -- so, most kinds of taxes on production are ultimately shifted
largely to immobile land, which can neither starve nor flee. The
converse of this is that when these taxes are lightened, the primary
result of tax un-shifting is an increase in the gross rent of land. A
moderate dose of single tax therapy will, in all likelihood, actually
increase net (after-tax) rents received by landowners. As the rent tax
rate approaches 100%, the effect of the increase in the rent tax must
eventually overtake the contrary effect of the decrease in other taxes;
land prices will approach zero. Still, if the single tax program is
installed gradually, there is no undue burden on current landowners.
Third, some degree of shifting of the rent tax onto capital may occur
after all, although only as the result of healthy, growth-producing
wealth and liquidity effects, not from any distortionary tax "wedge."
As Henry George emphasized and as Mason Gaffney has rigorously shown, [for
a review, see Gaffney: 1992] by reducing land prices and bypassing
credit markets, the single tax makes it easier for cash-poor new
producers to acquire land. At the same time, by raising holding costs,
the tax makes it harder for unproductive hoarders to hold their savings
in idle land, anticipating so-called "capital" gains and
confident that any reversal in the upward trend of land prices can only
be temporary. The consequence is an increase in the intensity with which
land is used, which necessarily raises the demand for labor and capital.
Even if credit markets were perfect, the single tax would stimulate
capital formation. A rent tax reduces or eliminates private savers'
option of holding land as an asset: The asset value of land (or some
proportion of it) is now public property. Savings are thus redirected
from land into produced capital, stimulating investment and (depending
on the supply elasticity of capital) possibly lowering the marginal rate
of return to capital. Furthermore, wages again tend to rise, not fall,
as workers are employed to produce and use the new capital. All this, of
course, is to the good. [Feldstein, 1977; Gaffney, 1092]
Grant's foremost charge against the single tax is his most desperate
and far-fetched, but also the one which promises the greatest shock to
conservative readers. This is the charge that Georgism is really a
dangerous formula for repressive socialism, masquerading as benign
free-market economics.
In adopting the term "user charge", [Georgists]
seem to have been ... taken in by the Marxist approach, which holds
that the state is the true owner of the land. [61]
I have noted that Grant confuses the concepts of government property,
res communis, and res nullius. In the Georgist approach,
natural resources are owned, not by the state, but by all the people in
common. True, some public authority -- a government -- must collect and
distribute the rent. But land is held in private title; markets operate
freely; individuals manage their own affairs.
Society would thus approach the ideal of Jeffersonian
democracy, ... the abolition of government ... as a directing and
repressive power. ...We should reach the [egalitarian] ideal of the
socialist, but not through government repression. Government would
change its character, and would become the administration of a great
co-operative society. It would become merely the agency by which the
common property was administered for the common benefit. [George,
1879: 455-457]
But Grant's accusation of single-tax socialism is more than a matter of
philosophical language. "Professor Knight," he writes, "puts
it bluntly:" [62]
To collect such rent, the government would in practice have
to compel the owner actually to use the land in the best way, hence to
prescribe its use in some detail. [Knight, 1953: 809; quoted in
Grant: 62]
Now, in a single-tax world, rational individuals who bid successfully
for title to land are generally able to pay the 100% rent tax and still
earn a market rate of return on their labor and capital. If no one
volunteers to take a certain land parcel and pay the assessed tax, this
constitutes direct and publicly-available evidence that the assessment
on that parcel is too high; it overestimates the value of the land.
Why, then, would a tax on rent entail central planning? Knight's only
explanation is that "some official, some 'bureaucrat' with power,
would have to appraise it," [Knight, 1953: 809] an
observation which does not set rent taxation apart from many other,
apparently unobjectionable taxes. Grant's marvelous rationale cannot
fairly be credited to Knight:
Georgists are aware of the "supply side" effects
on all the other tax bases, but why would the famous Laffer Curve not
also apply to their single tax? As a tax rate approaches 100% of any
tax base, revenues will approach zero in the long run. This tax on
rent is not compatible with a market economy because it would
eliminate any incentive for landlords to charge rent that would be
captured by the government. ...To obtain revenue, government assessors
would have to set the level of tax arbitrarily, thereby placing
virtual control of the land in the hands of the state. [61-62]
The Laffer Curve, which reflects the excess burden of taxation caused
by substitution effects, does indeed apply to all taxes conditioned on
productive activity. It applies, for example, to a tax on land income,
Just as it does to a tax on labor income (wages), or interest, or
exports, or beer purchases. However, neither the market-estimated
potential income of land, i.e., rent, nor its capitalized value (based
on discounted future rents) is subject to the discretion of the
title-holder. From his viewpoint, as I have explained, these taxes are
lump-sum charges; the landowner cannot reduce his tax burden by
decreasing output and income, by selling land, or by any other means.
Without the Laffer Curve, however, Grant's dire prediction of market
collapse, land nationalization and Socialist tyranny has no foundation
whatsoever.
It is hard to imagine bow anyone sufficiently familiar with both
mainstream and Georgist economics to put his opinions into print can
have analyzed the case for the single tax so perfectly wrongly -- unless
his intent is to pre-empt debate by portraying the Georgist proposal as
dangerous nonsense, discouraging readers from ever investigating the
question for themselves. I have to conclude that Richard Grant aims to
deprive the people of South Africa of an informed choice. Though he
laughs at the Georgists' suspicion "of some conspiracy of silence,n
[59] his own example confirms that the shadow of Knight still
obscures the fundamental issue of resource rights.
"Economists," Grant tells us, "have utterly refuted much
of what George had to say about the "single tax'." [60]
The proposal enjoys a wave of popularity every generation or so, but
economists time and again "expose its faults." [51]
Today, boasts Grant, Georgists are "in retreat," as evidenced
by the fact that they will now accept a tax rate somewhat less than 100%
-- say, 80% -- in quiet and partial recognition of the distortions which
a high rent tax would cause. [62] If a rate of 80% is
acceptable, he reasons, why not 50%, or 12%, or 2%? "[O]nce the
mystical character of the tax is broken, a tax on land rent becomes a
tax like any other." [62]
In truth, Georgists are on the advance, as evidenced not only by an
explosion of theoretical developments within academia, [Feder, 1993]
but also by political developments in South Africa, Russia, the United
States, and elsewhere. And despite the impressive success of the
neo-classical stratagem, a not inconsiderable number of well-known and
distinguished economists, Nobel Prize winners among them, eagerly
support the principle of public collection of resource rents. [Tideman,
1991] As alternative solutions fade like enticing mirages in the
desert, the world is discovering anew that the Georgist paradigm offers
a sober, peaceful, and civilized path to genuine reform.
REFERENCES
Brown, Harry Gunnison 1927
"Land Speculation and Land Value Taxation."
Journal of Political Economy 35: 390-402.
Dwyer, Terence Michael 1981
A History of the Theory of Land Value Taxation. Ph.D.
dissertation, Harvard University.
Feder, Kris 1993
Issues in the Theory of Land Value Taxation. Ph.D. dissertation,
Temple University.
Feder, Kris forthcoming
" NEW TITLE FOR "HG: A FOOTNOTE...?"
Feldstein, Martin S. 1977
"The Surprising Incidence of a Tax on Pure Rent: A New Answer to
an Old Question." Journal of Political Economy 85: 349-360.
Franzsen, RCD, and Heynes, CH, eds. 1992
A Land Tax for the New South Africa? Pretoria: Centre for Human
Rights, University of Pretoria
Gaffney, Mason 1992
"Land Reform Through Tax Reform," in Franzsen and Heynes:
111-126.
George, Henry 1879
Progress and Poverty. New York: R. Schalkenbach Foundation,
1971.
George, Henry 1898
Science of Political Economy. New York: Robert Schalkenbach
Foundation.
Grant, Richard 1994
"Mysteries of the Land," in Nationalization; How
Governments Control You. Johannesburg: The Free Market Foundation.
Knight, Frank 1953
"The Fallacies in the Single Tax." The Freeman:
809-811.
Tideman, Nicolaus 1991
"Open Letter to Mikhail Gorbachev." In Noyes, Richard, ed.,
Now the Synthesis: Capitalism, Socialism, and the New Social
Contract: 225-230. New York: Holmes & Meier. With William
Baumol, Robert Dorfman, Mason Gaffney, Franco Modigliani, Richard
Musgrave, Robert Solow, James Tobin, William Vickrey, etc.
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