.
| The Supreme
Court and the Constitution |
In the following essay, which is
adapted from The Supreme Court and the Constitution
(1912), Charles Beard presents evidence that the framers of the
Constitution were less interested in furthering democratic
principles than in protecting private property and the interests
of the wealthy class. Since this work was written over eighty
years ago, there are a few anachronisms you may want to keep in
mind. First, when Beard speaks of the "Confederacy," he
is referring to the government that existed under the Articles of
Confederation -- not to the Confederate states that seceded from
the Union during the Civil War. Also, it is important to remember
that the Senate was still not elected by popular vote when Beard
was writing -- although that was changed in 1913 by the
Seventeenth Amendment. Finally, when Beard speaks of "republican"
or "democratic" tendencies, he is not referring to the
Republican or Democratic parties, but is instead using the words
in their more generic sense.
|
The reason and spirit of a law are to be understood only by an
inquiry into the circumstances of its enactment. The underlying purposes
of the Constitution, therefore, are to be revealed only by a study of
the conditions and events which led to formation and adoption.
At the outset it must be remembered that there were two
great parties at the time of the adoption of the Constitution -- one
laying emphasis on strength and efficiency in government and the other
on its popular aspects. Quite naturally the men who led in stirring up
the revolt against Great Britain and in keeping the fighting temper of
the Revolutionaries at the proper heat were the boldest and most radical
thinkers -- men like Samuel Adams, Thomas Paine, Patrick Henry, and
Thomas Jefferson. They were not, generally speaking, men of large
property interests or of much practical business experience. In a time
of disorder, they could consistently lay more stress upon personal
liberty than upon social control; and they pushed to the extreme limits
those doctrines of individual rights which had been evolved in England
during the struggles of the small landed proprietors and commercial
classes against royal prerogative, and which corresponded to the
economic conditions prevailing in America at the close of the eighteenth
century. They associated strong government with monarchy, and came to
believe that the best political system was one which governed least. A
majority of the radicals viewed all government, especially if highly
centralized, as a species of evil, tolerable only because necessary and
always to be kept down to an irreducible minimum by a jealous vigilance.
Jefferson put the doctrine in concrete form when he
declared that he preferred newspapers without government to government
without newspapers. The Declaration of Independence, the first state
Constitutions, and the Articles of Confederation bore the impress of
this philosophy. In their anxiety to defend the individual against all
federal interference and to preserve to the states a large sphere of
local autonomy, these Revolutionists had set up a system too weak to
accomplish the accepted objects of government; namely, national defense,
the protection of property, and the advancement of commerce. They were
not unaware of the character of their handiwork, but they believed with
Jefferson that "man was a rational animal endowed by nature with
rights and with an innate sense of justice and that he could be
restrained from wrong and protected in right by moderate powers confided
to persons of his own choice." Occasional riots and disorders, they
held, were preferable to too much government.
The new American political system based on these
doctrines had scarcely gone into effect before it began to incur
opposition from many sources. The close of the Revolutionary struggle
removed the prime cause for radical agitation and brought a new group of
thinkers into prominence. When independence had been gained, the
practical work to be done was the maintenance of social order, the
payment of the public debt, the provision of a sound financial system,
and the establishment of conditions favorable to the development of the
economic resources of the new country. The men who were principally
concerned in this work of peaceful enterprise were not the philosophers,
but men of business and property and the holders of public securities.
For the most part, they had had no quarrel with the system of class rule
and the strong centralization of government which had existed in
England. It was on the question of policy, not of governmental
structure, that they had broken with the British authorities. By no
means all of them, in fact, had even resisted the policy of the mother
country, for within the ranks of the conservatives were large numbers of
Loyalists who had remained in America, and, as was to have been
expected, cherished a bitter feeling against the Revolutionists,
especially the radical section which had been boldest in denouncing the
English system root and branch. In other words, after the heat and
excitement of the War of Independence were over and the new government,
state and national, was tested by the ordinary experiences of traders,
financiers, and manufacturers, it was found inadequate, and these groups
accordingly grew more and more determined to reconstruct the political
system in such a fashion as to make it subserve their permanent
interests.
Under the state constitutions and the Articles of
Confederation established during the Revolution, every powerful economic
class in the nation suffered either immediate losses or from impediments
placed in the way of the development of their enterprises. The holders
of the securities of the [government established by the Articles of
Confederation] did not receive the interest on their loans. Those who
owned Western lands or looked with longing eyes upon the rich
opportunities for speculation there chaffed at the weakness of the
government and its delays in establishing order on the frontiers.
Traders and commercial men found their plans for commerce on a national
scale impeded by local interference with interstate commerce. The
currency of the states and the nation was hopelessly muddled. Creditors
everywhere were angry about the depreciated paper money which the
agrarians had made and were attempting to force upon those from whom
they had borrowed specie. In short, it was a war between business and
populism. Under the Articles of Confederation, populism had a free hand,
for majorities in the state legislatures were omnipotent. Anyone who
reads the economic history of the time will see why the solid
conservative interests of the country were weary of talk about the "rights
of the people" and bent upon establishing firm guarantees for the
rights of property.
The Congress of the Confederation was not long in
discovering the true character of the futile authority which the
Articles had conferred upon it. The necessity for new sources of revenue
became apparent even while the struggle for independence was yet
undecided, and, in 1871, Congress carried a resolution to the effect
that it should be authorized to lay a duty of five percent on certain
goods. This moderate proposition was defeated because Rhode Island
rejected it on the grounds that "she regarded it the most precious
jewel of sovereignty that no state shall be called upon to open its
purse but by the authority of the state and by her own officers."
Two years later, Congress prepared another amendment to the Articles
providing for certain import duties, the receipts from which, collected
by state officers, were to be applied to the payment of the public debt;
but three years after the introduction of the measure, four states,
including New York, still held out against its ratification, and the
project was allowed to drop. At last, in 1786, Congress in a resolution
declared that the requisitions for the last eight years had been so
irregular in their operation, so uncertain in their collection, and so
evidently unproductive that a reliance on them in the future would be no
less dishonorable to the understandings of those who entertained it than
it would be dangerous to the welfare and peace of the Union. Congress,
thereupon, solemnly added that it had become its duty "to declare
most explicitly that the crisis had arrived when the people of the
United States, by whose will and for whose benefit the federal
government was instituted, must decide whether they will support their
rank as a nation by maintaining the public faith at home and abroad, or
rather for the want of a timely exertion in establishing a general
review and thereby giving strength to the Confederacy, they will hazard
not only the existence of the Union but those great and invaluable
privileges for which they have so arduously and so honorably contended."
In fact, the Articles of Confederation had hardly gone
into effect before the leading citizens also began to feel that the
powers of Congress were wholly inadequate. In 1780, even before their
adoption, Alexander Hamilton proposed a general convention to frame a
new constitution, and from that time forward he labored with remarkable
zeal and wisdom to extend and popularize the idea of a strong national
government. Two years later, the Assembly of the State of New York
recommended a convention to revise the Articles and increase the power
of the Congress. In 1783, Washington, in a circular letter to the
governors, urged that it was indispensable to the happiness of the
individual states that there should be lodged somewhere a supreme power
to regulate and govern the general concerns of the confederation.
Shortly afterward (1785), Governor Bowdoin, of Massachusetts, suggested
to his state legislature the advisability of calling a national assembly
to settle upon and define the powers of Congress; and the legislature
resolved that the government under the Articles of Confederation was
inadequate and should be reformed; but the resolution was never laid
before Congress.
In January, 1786, Virginia invited all the other states
to send delegates to a convention at Annapolis to consider the question
of duties on imports and the commerce in general. When this convention
assembled in 1786, delegates from only five states were present, and
they were disheartened at the limitations on their powers and the lack
of interest the other states had shown in the project. With
characteristic foresight, however, Alexander Hamilton seized the
occasion to secure the adoption of a recommendation advising the states
to choose representatives for another convention to meet in Philadelphia
the following year "to consider the Articles of Confederation and
to propose such changes therein as might render them adequate to the
exigencies of the union." This recommendation was cautiously
worded, for Hamilton did not want to raise any unnecessary alarm. He
doubtless believed that a complete revolution in the old system was
desirable, but he knew that, in the existing state of popular temper, it
was not expedient to announce his complete program. Accordingly, no
general reconstruction of the political system was suggested; the
Articles of Confederation were merely to be "revised"; and the
amendments were to be approved by the state legislatures as provided by
that instrument.
The proposal of the Annapolis convention was
transmitted to the state legislatures and laid before Congress. Congress
thereupon resolved in February, 1787, that a convention should be held
for the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of
Confederation and reporting to itself and the legislatures of the
several states such alterations and provisions as would when agreed to
by Congress and confirmed by the states render the federal constitution
adequate to the exigencies of government and the preservation of the
union.
In pursuance of this call, delegates to the new
convention were chosen by the legislatures of the states or by the
governors in conformity to authority conferred by the legislative
assemblies. The delegates were given instructions of a general nature by
their respective states, none of which, apparently, contemplated any
very far-reaching changes. In fact, almost all of them expressly limited
their representative to a mere revision of the Articles of
Confederation. For example, Connecticut authorized her delegates to
represent and confer for the purpose mentioned in the resolution of
Congress and to discuss such measures "agreeable to the general
principles of Republican government" as they should think proper to
render the Union adequate. Delaware, however, went so far as to provide
that none of the proposed alterations should extend to the fifth part of
the Articles of Confederation guaranteeing that each state should be
entitled to one vote.
It was a truly remarkable assembly of men that gathered
in Philadelphia on May 17, 1787, to undertake the work of reconstructing
the American system of government. It is not merely patriotic pride that
compels one to assert that never in the history of assemblies has there
been a convention of men richer in political experience and practical
knowledge, or endowed with a profounder insight into the springs of
human action and the intimate essence of government. It is indeed an
astounding fact that at one time so many men skilled in statecraft could
be found on the very frontiers of civilization among a population
numbering about four million whites. It is no less a cause for
admiration that their instrument of government should have survived the
trials and crises of a century that saw the wreck of more than a score
of paper constitutions.
All the members had had a practical training in
politics. Washington, as commander-in-chief of the Revolutionary forces,
had learned well the lessons and problems of war, and mastered
successfully the no less difficult problems of administration. The two
Morrises had distinguished themselves in grappling with financial
questions as trying and perplexing as any which statesmen had ever been
compelled to face. Seven of the delegates had gained political wisdom as
governors of their native states; and no less than twenty-eight had
served in Congress, either during the Revolution or under the Articles
of Confederation. These were men trained in the law, versed in finance,
skilled in administration, and learned in the political philosophy of
their own and earlier times. Moreover, they were men destined to
continue public service under the government which they had met to
construct -- Presidents, Vice-Presidents, heads of departments, Justices
of the Supreme Court were in that imposing body. ...
The makers of the Constitution represented the solid,
conservative, commercial and financial interests of the country -- not
the interests which denounced and proscribed judges in Rhode Island, New
Jersey, and North Carolina, and stoned their houses in New York. The
conservative interests, made desperate by the imbecilities of the
Confederation and harried by state legislatures, roused themselves from
the lethargy, drew together in a mighty effort to establish a government
that would be strong enough to pay the national debt, regulate
interstate and foreign commerce, provide for national defense, prevent
fluctuations in the currency created by paper emissions, and control the
propensities of legislative majorities to attack private rights...The
radicals, however, like Patrick Henry, Jefferson, and Samuel Adams, were
conspicuous by their absence from the Convention.
The Convention was convened to frame a government that
would meet the practical issues that had arisen under the Articles of
Confederation. The objections they entertained to direct popular
government, and they were undoubtedly many, were based upon their
experience with popular assemblies during the immediately preceding
years. With many of the plain lessons of history before them, they
naturally feared that the rights and privileges of the minority would be
insecure if the principle of majority rule was definitely adopted and
provisions made for its exercise. Furthermore, it will be remembered
that up to that time the right of all men, as men, to share in the
government had never been recognized in practice. Everywhere in Europe
the government was in the hands of a ruling monarch or at best a ruling
class; everywhere the mass of the people had been regarded principally
as an arms-bearing and tax-paying multitude, uneducated, and with little
hope or capacity for advancement. Two years were to elapse after the
meeting of the grave assembly at Philadelphia before the transformation
of the Estates General into the National Convention in France opened the
floodgates of revolutionary ideas on human rights before whose rising
tide old landmarks of government are still being submerged. It is small
wonder, therefore, that, under the circumstances, many members of that
august body held popular government in slight esteem and took the people
into consideration only as far as it was imperative "to inspire
them with the necessary confidence," as Mr. Gerry [one of the
framers of the Constitution] frankly put it.
Indeed, every page of the laconic record of the
proceedings of the convention, preserved to posterity by Mr. Madison,
shows conclusively that the members of that assembly were not seeking to
realize any fine notions about democracy and equality, but were striving
with all the resources of political wisdom at their command to set up a
system of government that would be stable and efficient, safeguarded on
the one hand against the possibilities of despotism and on the other
against the onslaught of majorities. In the mind of Mr. Gerry, the evils
they had experienced flowed "from the excess of democracy,"
and he confessed that while he was still republican, he "had been
taught by experience the danger of the levelling spirit." Mr.
Randolph, in offering to the consideration of the convention his plan of
government, observed "that the general object was to provide a cure
for the evils under which the United States labored; that, in tracing
these evils to their origin, every man had found it in the turbulence
and follies of democracy; that some check therefore was to be sought for
against this tendency of our governments; and that a good Senate seemed
most likely to answer the purpose." Mr. Hamilton, in advocating a
life term for Senators, urged that "all communities divide
themselves into the few and the many. The first are the rich and well
born and the other the mass of the people who seldom judge or determine
right."
Governor Morris wanted to check the "precipitancy,
changeableness, and excess" of the representatives of the people by
the ability and virtue of men" of great and established property --
aristocracy; men who from pride will support consistency and permanency.
...Such an aristocratic body will keep down the turbulence of democracy."
While these extreme doctrines were somewhat counterbalanced by the
democratic principles of Mr. Wilson, who urged that "the government
ought to possess, not only first, the force, but second, the mind or
sense of the people at large," Madison doubtless summed up in a
brief sentence the general opinion of the convention when he said that
to secure private rights against minority factions, and at the same time
to preserve the spirit and form of popular government, was the great
object to which their inquiries had been directed.
They were anxious above everything else to safeguard
the rights of private property against any leveling tendencies on the
part of the propertyless masses. Governor Morris, in speaking on the
problem of apportioning representatives, correctly stated the sound
historical fact when he declared: "Life and liberty were generally
said to be of more value than property. An accurate view of the matter,
nevertheless, would prove that property was the main object of
society...If property, then was the main object of government, certainly
it ought to be one measure of the influence due to those who were to be
affected by the government." Mr. King also agreed that "property
was the primary object of society," and Mr. Madison warned the
convention that in framing a system which they wished to last for ages
they must not lose sight of the changes which the ages would produce in
the forms and distribution of property. In advocating a long term in
order to give independence and firmness to the Senate, he described
these impending changes: "An increase in the population will of
necessity increase the proportion of those who will labor under all the
hardships of life and secretly sigh for a more equitable distribution of
its blessings. These may in time outnumber those who are placed above
the feelings of indigence. According to the equal laws of suffrage, the
power will slide into the hands of the former. No agrarian attempts have
yet been made in this country, but symptoms of a levelling spirit, as we
have understood have sufficiently appeared, in a certain quarter, to
give notice of the future danger." And again, in support of the
argument for a property qualification on voters, Madison urged: "In
future times, a great majority of the people will not only be without
land, but without any other sort of property. These will either combine,
under the influence of their common situation, -- in which case the
rights of property and the public liberty will not be secure in their
hands, -- or, what is more probable, they will become the tools of
opulence and ambition; in which case there will be equal danger on
another side." Various projects for setting up class rule by the
establishment of property qualifications for voters and officers were
advanced in the convention, but they were defeated....
The absence of such property qualifications is
certainly not due to any belief in Jefferson's free and equal doctrine.
It is due rather to the fact that the members of the convention could
not agree on the nature and amount of the qualifications. Naturally, a
landed qualification was suggested, but for obvious reasons it was
rejected. Although it was satisfactory to the landed gentry of the
South, it did not suit the financial, commercial, and manufacturing
gentry of the North. If it was high, the latter would be excluded; if it
was low, it would let in the populistic farmers who had already made so
much trouble in the state legislatures with paper-money schemes and
other devices for "relieving agriculture." One of the chief
reasons for calling the convention and framing the Constitution was to
promote commerce and industry and to protect personal property against
the depredations of Jefferson's noble freeholders. On the other hand, a
personal property qualification, high enough to please merchant princes
like Robert Morris or Nathaniel Gorham would shut out Southern planters.
Again, an alternative of land or personal property, high enough to
afford safeguards to large interests, would doubtless bring about the
rejection of the whole Constitution by the troublemaking farmers who had
to pass upon the question of ratification.
Nevertheless, by the system of checks and balances
placed in the government, the convention safeguarded the interests of
property against attacks by majorities. The House of Representatives,
Mr. Hamilton pointed out, "was so formed as to render it
particularly the guardian of the poorer orders of citizens," while
the Senate was to preserve the rights of property and the interests of
the minority against the demands of the majority. In the tenth number of
The Federalist, Mr. Madison argued in a philosophic vein in support of
the proposition that it was necessary to base the political system on
the actual conditions of "natural inequality." Uniformity of
interests throughout the state, he contended, was impossible on account
of the diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of
property originated; the protection of these faculties was the first
object of government; from the protection of different and unequal
faculties of acquiring property the possession of different degrees and
kinds of property immediately resulted; from the influence of these on
the sentiments and views of the respective proprietors ensued a division
of society into different interests and parties; the unequal
distribution of wealth inevitably led to a clash of interests in which
the majority was liable to carry out its policies at the expense of the
minority; hence, he added, in concluding this splendid piece of logic, "the
majority, having such coexistent passion or interest, must be rendered
by their number and local situation unable to concert and carry into
effect schemes of oppression"; and in his opinion, it was the great
merit of the newly framed Constitution that it secured the rights of the
minority against "the superior force of an interested and
overbearing majority."
This very system of checks and balances, which is
undeniably the essential element of the Constitution, is built upon the
doctrine that the popular branch of the government cannot be allowed
full sway, and least of all in the enactment of laws touching the rights
of property. The exclusion of the direct popular vote in the election of
the President; the creation, again by indirect election, of a Senate
which the framers hoped would represent the wealth and conservative
interests of the country, and the establishment of an independent
judiciary appointed by the President with the concurrence of the Senate
-- all these devices bear witness to the fact that the underlying
purpose of the Constitution was not the establishment of popular
government by means of parliamentary majorities.
Page after page of The Federalist is directed to that
portion of the electorate which was disgusted with the "mutability
of public councils." Writing on the presidential veto, Hamilton
says: "The propensity of the legislative department to intrude upon
the rights and absorb the powers of other departments has already been
suggested and repeated. ...It may perhaps be said that the power of
preventing bad laws included the power of preventing good ones; and may
be used to the one purpose as well as the other. But this objection will
have little weight with those who can properly estimate the mischiefs of
that inconstancy and mutability in the laws which form the greater
blemish in the character and genius of our governments. They will
consider every institution calculated to restrain the excess of
law-making and to keep things in the same state in which they happen to
be at any given period, as more likely to do good than harm; because it
is favorable to greater stability in the system of legislation. The
injury which may possibly be done by defeating a few good laws will be
amply compensated by the advantage of preventing a number of bad ones."[]
When the framers of the Constitution had completed the remarkable
instrument which was to establish a national government capable of
discharging effectively certain great functions and checking the
propensities of popular legislatures to attack the rights of private
property, a formidable task remained before them -- the task of securing
the adoption of the new frame of government by states torn with popular
dissentions. They knew very well that the state legislatures which had
been so negligent in paying their quotas [of money] under the Articles
of Confederation and which had been so jealous of their rights, would
probably stick at ratifying such a national instrument of government.
Accordingly, they cast aside that clause in the Articles requiring
amendments to be ratified by the legislatures of all of the states; and
advised that the new Constitution should be ratified by conventions in
the several states composed of delegates chosen by the voters. It was
largely because the framers of the Constitution knew the temper and
class bias of the state legislatures that they arranged that the new
Constitution should be ratified by conventions. They furthermore
declared -- and this is an fundamental matter -- that when the
conventions of nine states had ratified the Constitution the new
government should go into effect so far as those states were concerned.
The chief reason for resorting to ratifications by conventions is laid
down by Hamilton in Federalist 22: "It has not a little contributed
to the infirmities of the existing federal system that it never had a
ratification by the people. Resting on no better foundation that the
consent of the several legislatures, it has been exposed to frequent and
intricate questions concerning the validity of its powers; and has in
some instances given birth to the enormous doctrine of a right of
legislative repeal. Owing its ratification to the law of a state, it has
been contended that the same authority might repeal the law by which it
was ratified. However gross a heresy it may be to maintain that a party
to a compact has a right to revoke that compact, the doctrine itself has
respectable advocates. The possibility of a question of this nature
proves the necessity of laying the foundations of our national
government deeper than in the mere sanction of delegated authority. The
fabric of American empire ought to rest on the solid basis of the
consent of the people. The streams of national power ought to flow
immediately from that pure original foundation of all legitimate
authority."
Of course, the convention did not resort to the
revolutionary policy of transmitting the Constitution directly to the
conventions of the several states. It merely laid the finished
instrument before the Confederate Congress with the suggestion that it
should be submitted to "a convention of delegates chosen in each
state by the people thereof, under the recommendation of its
legislature, for them assent and ratification; and each convention
assenting thereto and ratifying the same should give notice thereof to
the United States in Congress assembled." The convention went on to
suggest that when nine states had ratified the Constitution, the
Confederate Congress should extinguish itself by making provisions for
the elections necessary to put the new government into effect....
After the new Constitution was published and transmitted to the
states, there began a long and bitter fight over ratification. A
veritable flood of pamphlet literature descended upon the country, and a
collection of these pamphlets by Hamilton, Madison, and Jay, brought
together under the title of The Federalist -- though clearly a piece of
campaign literature -- has remained a permanent part of the contemporary
sources on the Constitution and has been regarded by many lawyers as a
commentary second in value only to the decisions of the Supreme Court.
Within a year the champions of the new government found themselves
victorious, for on June 21, 1788, the ninth state, New Hampshire,
ratified the Constitution, and accordingly the new government might go
into effect as between the agreeing states. Within a few weeks, the
nationalist party in Virginia and New York succeeded in winning these
two states, and in spite of the fact that North Carolina and Rhode
Island had not yet ratified the Constitution, Congress determined to put
the instrument into effect in accordance with the recommendations of the
convention.
|