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Another Kind of Trickle Down |
| [Reprinted from GroundSwell,
September-October 2005] |
When an economy generates product, some of it becomes cast as a surplus
that is exchanged among individual and corporate parties, but much of it
ultimately comes to settle on land sites, somewhere and somehow, in the
form of economic rent. We ought really to be calling this a kind of "trickle
down."
I don't fully understand how this passthrough the economy occurs.
Tracing the flow of rent in the economy is a challenge I believe would
strengthen understanding of Georgist economics. The effect of it all is
to increase market value of these sites as it ultimately settles there.
The classical economists, from Adam Smith on to Malthus, Ricardo, Mill
and finally with George, seem to have understood this very well, and the
concept of economic rent was central to their thinking for this reason.
With the arrival of neoclassical thought, site prices are understood as
the meeting of supply and demand curves, rent as such dropping out of
the picture.
I think we need to better appreciate how economic rent circulates
through the economy to settle upon what is classically called "land".
We accept the idea that economic rent is a function of the productivity
of locations; the greater the strategic access and utility of a site,
the greater the site rent to settle on those spots. We further
understand that the greatest amount of rent flows to locations where
people are, leading to higher market prices on urban sites than
peripheral sites. (Today this may need to read "where people use,"
due to the modern use of site resources such as airport timeslots,
geosynchronous satellite orbits and spectrum bands.) Because these land
sites have a fixed supply - i.e., are "inelastic" in economic
terminology - the rent settles at those points and stays there.
My favorite analogy for illustrating the creation and growth of
economic rent is the placement of a grid of new roads on an open expanse
of space. Given the design of a tic-tac-toe board with nine squares,
suppose then someone builds on each spot. If every square is then
improved - say with a hotel, a grocery store, a pharmacy, a gas station,
and so on - and the owner of the center square declines to build, the
land value of every plot rises, because each site adds value to every
other. But the land site with the greatest market value is the center
square on account of its strategic access - even though its owner did
nothing to "earn" that gain. The increase in value of the land
alone on all the sites is economic rent, a product of the common social
effort of every party but the "stand-patter" on the center
square. The titleholder of the center square is a "free-rider."
John Stuart Mill knew this well: he wrote that "Landlords grow
richer in their sleep without working, risking, or economizing. The
increase in the value of land, arising as it does from the efforts of an
entire community, should belong to the community and not to the
individual who might hold title."
There is an intrinsic morality to the argument that rent rightfully
belongs to the community and not to individual holders of property
titles. George thought any arrangements to the contrary amounted to
nothing short of theft. If the increase in the land's value is not
recovered by the community in the form of taxes, it remains the windfall
fortune of the titleholder. Thomas Gaskell Shearman, a promoter of
Georgist ideas shortly after the master's death, labeled its recapture "natural
taxation." Today we hear argued that people should "pay for
what they take, not for what they make." All this implies a respect
for resources owned and held in common, where "ownership" of
such means just the rights of use.
Our challenge as Georgists today is in spreading the idea that
ownership has a different meaning with respect (o natural resources than
it does for items that people create. Our society has conflated the
meaning of ownership to include both kinds. But it is from nature, and
only the nature, that economic rent stems. Only in modem western (and
westernized) societies has the distinction between leasehold and
freehold -- or else the words usufruct and fee-simple -- ownership been
lost. If one has opportunity to survey past histories and cultures, one
discovers that license to use is widely distinguished from license to
monopoly control, or to buy and sell. Native Americans, much as cultures
the world over, were overwhelmed by emerging European notions of
property titles in land, all to their disadvantage.
Can and should redress be made to aboriginal peoples? Likely not.
Recompense is both technically and politically impossible. I would argue
that it is not even warranted, because it posits links in generational
justice that are problematic. But restoration and protection of that
which is everyone's rightful due can be facilitated by the collection
and recovery of the economic rent that trickles down to land from the
cooperative enterprise of communities. Among those alive today
distributive justice would be much improved. Yet we are at the same time
witnessing the ravenous capture of natural resources - of air, water,
land, mineral wealth, and many other elements of the commons - by
corporate interests and advantaged peoples, all of which is increasing
the wealth disparity. The notion of the earth itself as a commons is in
jeopardy of being made obsolete, much as is the idea of economic rent.
Current enthusiasm for privatization of what is and ought to be the
birthright of all humanity is most troublesome. We Georgists argue that
only through recognition and appreciation of our ideas about ownership
and economic rent is it possible for the economy to function efficiently
and sustainably. We can see this most clearly when looking at the design
of our local communities and cities. There, even in small localities, we
can observe differential land values in various locations resulting from
the accretion of rent, value differences that are many multiples going
from periphery to center. The skylines of cities reflect the
differential market value of land sites, and taken in the aggregate the
general proportion is roughly one-third land value and two-thirds
improvement (building) value. Recent computer technologies permit the
creation of what have come to be called "landvaluescapes" that
quickly give a visual profile of the value of land sites throughout a
city. Values per acre can increase as much as a hundredfold from edge to
center. All this is reflective of the varying amount of economic rent
that settles to land sites.
Recovering the economic rent that otherwise accretes to land fosters
greater efficiency in the use of locational sites, enhances the
feasibility of transit services by ensuring greater proximity of access
points, and reduces the demand for infrastructure investment by more
compact site use. On the other hand, present tendencies not to use
high-value locations to their optimal advantage creates centrifugal
economic forces that result in sprawl, with the resulting pressure on
developers to choose sub-optimal and second-best sites. Yet the
collection of economic rent ensures that landsites are fully responsive
to market forces, leading to the greater vitality of cities and improved
social and environmental ambience for both residential and commercial
spaces.
Fortunately, the first-past-the-post greed that has characterized the
monopoly capture of natural resources in both historical and
contemporary America is not beyond remedy. By first recognizing the full
dimensions of the earth's commons, and then collecting the economic rent
that accretes to such places, we can foster both greater economic
efficiency and greater social justice. Titles for use need not be
challenged and markets for site choice need not be disturbed. All that
needs to be done is to gradually shift tax revenues off those elements
of the economy that are burdened by their levy, and onto those parts of
the economy that yield rent for the public to recover. Races that have
demonstrated the ease of such shifts are increasingly known, their
successes documented by the facile use of computer technology.
Forecasting the impact of tax shifts elsewhere is equally feasible when
financial data exists.
Recovery and distribution of the economic rent that otherwise falls
upon locational sites offers a means by which to redress economic
injustices, ones that stem largely from a distorted system of monopoly
control of common natural resources. Roosevelt's Secretary of Interior
Harold Ickes once disparaged "trickle down" economics,
observing that it was "feeding the horses to feed the flies."
But trickle down also describes the way by which the economic surplus
settles to land, in present circumstances to benefit the privileged few.
In a just economic system, it might describe finally how economic rent
is collected for the benefit of all.
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